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LIEN AVOIDANCE UNDER SECTION
522(f) IN THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA
JOHN
I.

B.

BUTLER, III*

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1978, President Carter signed into law the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code).1 One of
the many changes in the new Bankruptcy Code is the addition
of section 522(f).2 This new provision reflects Congress' desire to
further enhance a debtor's "fresh start" by removing certain un3
fair creditor practices.

To achieve this improved "fresh start," section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid certain liens on exempt property. For instance, a debtor may avoid a judicial lien on any property which
could have been exempted in the absence of the lien.4 Similarly,

a debtor may avoid a lien that impairs exemptions to which the
debtor is entitled under state law if the lien is created by a non* Member, South Carolina Bar. B.A. 1978, J.D. 1981, University of South Carolina.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)(principally codified at 11 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV 1982)).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1982) states:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are
held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6087.

4. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
362 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6318.
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possessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in various
types of household goods, tools of the trade, or health aids. 5
This Article will not attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of section 522(f). That contribution has been made by other
authors.' Rather, this Article will briefly survey those bankruptcy cases decided in the District of South Carolina which affect lien avoidance under section 522(f).
II.

THE MECHANICS OF LIEN AVOIDANCE

In Barker v. Household Finance,7 the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of South Carolina considered whether a debtor
could use section 522(f)(2)(A) to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in a case filed under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code." Unlike a Chapter 7 debtor who may retain only claimed exempt property, a Chapter 13 debtor is permitted to retain his property, exempt or otherwise, as provided
for in the proposed repayment planY Despite this distinction,
the bankruptcy court rejected the minority view 0 that lien
avoidance is not available in a Chapter 13 case and instead
adopted the majority view that section 103(a) requires that
section 522(f)(2)(A) be applied to Chapter 13 cases. 2
In another case, In re Hawkins, 3 the bankruptcy court ad-

5. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2). A purchase-money security interest is an interest taken
by a seller in the goods sold to ensure payment of their price. S.C. CoD ANN. § 36-9-107
(1976).
6. See, e.g., Vuckowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 769 (1980); Note, Protectionof a Debtor's "FreshStart" Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 843 (1980); Note, Lien Avoidance Under
Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code: Is Retroactive Application Constitutional?,49
FORDHAM L. REV. 615 (1981); Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Lien Avoidance
Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f)(2), 94 HARv. L. REV. 1616 (1981). See also Lacy,
South Carolina'sStatutory Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.L. Rv. 643
(1979).
7. 20 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982).
8. Id. at 12.
9. See generally Wickham, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13: Guiding Consumer Debtor
Choice Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 815 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Sands v. Blazer Fin. Serv., 15 B.R. 563 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1981); Aycock
v. Heritage Bank, 15 B.R. 728 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1981).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) states: "Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of this title."
12. 20 B.R. at 11-12.
13. No. 81-00837 (Bankr. D.S.C. Jan. 24, 1983), aff'd, No. 83-476-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 28,
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Section 522(f) in the District of South Caro
dressed numerous questions regarding the mechanics of lien
avoidance. The immediate issue before the court was whether
the debtors could, after a discharge was granted and the bankruptcy case closed, reopen a case pursuant to section 350(b).' 4
The debtors sought to file a lien avoidance action against a creditor who had commenced a claim and delivery action in state
court to obtain possession of the debtors' household goods as
5
satisfaction for the creditor's security interest.1
After reviewing the conflicting lines of authority on the issue and weighing the equities involved,' 6 the court ruled that the
debtors could not reopen the case for the purpose of filing a lien
avoidance action.' 7 In denying the debtors' motion to reopen the
case, the court applied a three-part test' and held as follows: (1)
the debtor failed to provide a justifiable excuse for the ninemonth delay between the execution of the order granting discharge and the debtors' motion to reopen the case; (2) by incur-

1983), aff'd, No. 83-1497 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 1984).
14. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 2. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) states: "[A] case may be reopened
in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause."
15. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 2.
16. In weighing the equities involved to determine whether a lien avoidance action
should be permitted after the discharge hearing or after the case is closed, the court
followed the rationale expressed in the following cases: In re Coomes, 20 B.R. 290
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Williams, 17 B.R. 204 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); Montney v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 17 B.R. 353 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); Towns v. Postal Fin. Co., 16
B.R. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); Associates Fin. Serv. v. Swanson, 13 B.R. 851 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1981).
Thus, the court in Hawkins chose not to follow those cases which hold that a lien
avoidance action may be filed at any time, even after the discharge hearing and the
closing of the case, regardless of the equities involved. See, e.g., In re Newton, 15 B.R.
640 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981); Baskins v. Household Fin. Corp., 14 B.R. 110 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1981); Gortmaker v. Avco Fin. Corp., 14 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981). Nor did
the court follow those cases which refuse to permit the reopening of cases for the filing of
lien avoidance actions after the discharge hearing, regardless of the equities involved.
See, e.g., Associates Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Porter, 11 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); In
re Krahn, 10 B.R. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981); In re Adkins, 7 B.R. 325 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1980).
17. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 10.
18. The three-part test is as follows:
To deny relief to the debtor, the record should show (1) a failure by the debtor
to act promptly in asserting his rights under § 522(f) without good cause therefore; (2) reliance by the creditor on the debtor's failure to assert his rights and
on assertion by the creditor of his rights against the property based on such
reliance; and (3) a creditor who is acting and has acted in good faith.
Towns v. Postal Fin. Co., 16 B.R. 949, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982).
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ring expenses to commence the claim and delivery action, the
creditor had detrimentally relied on the debtors' delay in filing
the lien avoidance action; and (3) the creditor had not acted in
bad faith."'
The court in Hawkins also discussed the substantive effect
and procedural ramifications of the debtors' failure to avoid the
creditor's security interest. The court stated that even though
section 524(a)(2) 20 shields a debtor from personal liability on a
discharged debt, section 506(d) 21 provides that a valid, unavoided, prefiled lien remains enforceable in rem to the extent
that an allowed secured claim exists.22 The court then examined
section 522(c)(2) 23 and held
that valid liens may be enforced
24
against exempt property.
In light of Hawkins, a debtor's attorney should file any nec-

19. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 10.
20.
A discharge in a case under this title(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement of an action, the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of
the debtor whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; ....
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
21.
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless(1) a party in interest has not requested that the court determine
and allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title; or
(2) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
22. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 3-4.
23.
Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not
liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is
determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case, except(2) a lien that is(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of
this title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C)(i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2).
24. No. 81-00837, slip op. at 4-5.
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essary lien avoidance motion 25 as soon as possible after filing the
petition for relief. Failure to file a lien avoidance motion
promptly may cause a debtor to lose property which was subject
to an otherwise avoidable lien.
III.

THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF

§ 522(f)

The issue of whether section 522(f) could be applied retroactively to avoid judicial liens or security interests obtained
prior to the Code's enactment or effective date without violating
the fifth amendment has been the subject of much litigation.
Thus, any discussion of lien avoidance must examine whether
section 522(f) can be applied constitutionally to judicial liens or
security interests created prior to either November 6, 1978, the
enactment of the Code, or October 1, 1979, its effective date.2 6
A.

The Retroactive Avoidance of JudicialLiens

In Hinson v. Lexington State Bank, 7 the bankruptcy court
considered whether the retroactive application of section
522(f)(1) to avoid judicial liens 28 obtained prior to the Code's
enactment violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 29 The debtors in Hinson sought to avoid four judgment
liens which encumbered their residence.30 Two of the liens were
recorded prior to the Code's enactment.
To decide whether the retroactive application of section
522(f)(1) violated the due process clause, the bankruptcy court
examined South Carolina law to determine whether the avoid-

25. As of August 1, 1983, Bankruptcy Rules 4003(d) and 9014 require the filing of a
motion to commence a lien avoidance action. Thus, a complaint to avoid a lien is no
longer necessary or advised.
26. Section 402(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). The time between the
enactment date and the effective date is known as the "gap period."
27. 20 B.R. 753 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). For another discussion of Hinson, see infra
notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
28. A "judicial lien" is a lien "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other
legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
29. 20 B.R. at 757. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states, in pertinent part: "No person shall
be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation...."
30. 20 B.R. at 755. Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-810 (1976), a judgment becomes a lien on any real estate the judgment debtor owns in the county where the judgment is recorded. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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ance of judicial liens improperly interfered with a property interest "worthy of constitutional protection." 31 The court first
noted a distinction between the property interests of judgment
creditors and the property interests of holders of secured interests: 32 a judgment lien does not grant a judgment creditor a
property interest in specific property, nor does it transfer any
estate in the debtor's real property to the judgment creditor.3 3

Because of this distinction, the court held that "the retroactive
application of [section] 522(f)(1) does not constitute a taking of
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment."3 4 The court then
allowed the debtor to avoid the judicial liens to the extent they
impaired the debtor's homestead exemptions.3"

After Hinson, the current law, at least in South Carolina, is
that a debtor may use section 522(f)(1) to avoid judicial liens,
created at any time, to the extent those liens impair the debtor's

exemptions.

6

31. 20 B.R. at 757.
32. In discussing the nature of a judicial lien holder's interest, the court stated:
The interest held by a judgment creditor is different from that held by a
mortgagee or security interest holder. While a mortgage or a security interest is
a specific lien on a specific item of property, a judgment lien is a general lien
upon all of the debtor's real estate. See Weatherly v. Medlin, 141 S.C. 290, 139
S.E. 633 (1927). Thus, a judicial lien holder does not have a property interest
in a specific parcel of real estate. Unlike a mortgagee or a security interest
holder, a judicial lien holder does not look to a specific piece of property from
which to satisfy his debt. Instead, a judgment creditor looks to any and all
property owned by the debtor at the time his judgment becomes a lien. "Hence
the creditor is not interested in property as property, but only in his lien."
20 B.R. at 758 (quoting In re Ashe, 10 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981)).
33. 20 B.R. at 758.
34. Id. The court also noted that while Hinson was distinguishable from Household
Fin. Corp. v. Glynn, infra note 40, the two cases were not inconsistent. 20 B.R. at 758.
35. 20 B.R. at 758-59.
36. After the bankruptcy court decided Hinson, the United States Supreme Court
held in United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982), that Congress did
not intend § 522(0(2) to be applied retroactively to avoid security interests created prior
to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. After deciding Security Indus. Bank, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded without opinion a Third Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision which had held that § 522(0(1) could be applied retroactively to avoid a judicial
lien created by confession of judgment. See In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982),
vacated sub nom. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. Ashe, 103 S. Ct. 563 (1982). Upon remand, the Third Circuit affirmed its earlier decision, finding the reasoning in Security
Indus. Bank inapplicable to judicial liens. In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1983), reh'g
denied, 712 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1983)(en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1279 (1984).
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The Retroactive Avoidance of Security Interests

The United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of
whether a debtor could use section 522(f)(2) to avoid a security
interest 37 created prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in United States v. Security Industrial Bank.38 The Supreme Court held that section 522(f)(2) could not be applied retroactively to security interests obtained prior to the Code's
enactment.39
The Court did not reach the issue of whether the retroactive
application of section 522(f)(2) violated the taking clause of the
fifth amendment.40 Instead, the Court avoided this constitutional issue by finding that Congress did not intend for section
522(f)(2) to affect property rights, including nonpurchase-money
security interests, created prior to the Code's enactment. 41
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to consider whether
section 522(f)(2) applies to security interests created after the
Code's enactment but prior to its effective date,42 and if so,
whether such application violates the taking clause.43 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina addressed these
issues in Singleton v. Barclays American Corp." There, the
37. A "security interest" is a "lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).
38. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
39. Id. at 414.
40. The Supreme Court did note that "there is substantial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the appellees' liens in these cases comports with the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 412.
Prior to the Security Indus. Bank decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
South Carolina addressed this same constitutional issue in Household Fin. Corp. v.
Glynn, 13 B.R. 647 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981). In Glynn, the court held that the retroactive
application of § 522(f)(2) would violate the fifth amendment.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 414. Citing Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914), and Auffm'ordt v.
Rasin, 102 U.S. 620 (1881), the Court stated:
No bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an explicit command from
Congress. In light of this principle, the legislative history of the 1978 Act suggests that Congress may not have intended that § 522(0 operate to destroy
pre-enactment property rights.
103 S. Ct. at 414.
42. In Security Indus. Bank, the Supreme Court stated: "Because all of the liens at
issue in this case were established before the enactment date we have no occasion to
consider whether § 522(0(2) should be applied to liens established after Congress passed
the Act, but before it became effective." Id. n.11.
43. See supra note 40.
44. 14 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1984

7

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1984], Art.
4

35

bankruptcy court held that section 522(f)(2) did apply to security interests created after the Code's enactment but prior to its
effective date,45 and that such an application was not unconstitutional. 6 The bankruptcy court reasoned that the retroactive
application of section 522(f)(2) to avoid these security interests
was not unconstitutional because, after the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, creditors had notice that certain security in-

terests would be avoidable. 7
In summary, to determine the current law governing section
522(f) in the District of South Carolina, the lien in question first
must be classified as either a security interest or 'a judicial lien.
If the lien involved is a judicial lien, a debtor may use section
522(f)(1) to avoid the lien regardless of when the lien was created. If, however, the lien is a security interest created prior to

45. Id.
46. In distinguishing the application of § 522(f)(2) in Glynn from its application in
Singleton, the bankruptcy court stated:
In In re Glynn, 13 B.R. 647 (Bkrtcy. 1981) and In re Morris, 13 B.R. 647
(Bkrtcy. 1981) this court held that the application of 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) to
avoid security interests created prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on November 6, 1978 would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The holding in the Glynn and Morris cases does not support the conclusion that the application of section 522(0(2) to avoid security
interests created after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, but prior to its
effective date, would violate the Fifth Amendment Rather, the court concludes
that after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code creditors were on notice that
non-possessory nonpurchase-money security interests upon household goods
were voidable in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. Hence, any reliance that
Commercial Credit placed upon its security interest was unreasonable and insubstantial, and the avoidance of Commercial Credit's security interest would
not effect a substantial impairment of its protected property rights in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. The court concurs with the result Judge Reynolds
reached in In re Osborne, 11 B.R. 610 (Bkrtcy. D.S.C. 1981) and holds that the
applica-tion of section 522(f)(2) to avoid security interests created after November 6, 1978, the date of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, does not
violate the Fifth Amendment.
14 B.R. at 1007-08. Accord, In re Schrimp, 17 B.R. 36 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981); G.F.C.
Corp. v. Noland, 13 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer, 10 B.R. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); Kursh v. Dial Fin. Co., 9 B.R. 801 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1981); Sweeny v. Pacific Fin. Co., 7 B.R. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1980); Baker v.
G.F.C. Corp., 5 B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980); Sioux Falls Veterans Admin. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Van Gorkom, 4 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980); Boulton v. General Fin. Loan Corp., 4 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980).
Contra, In re Johnson, 11 B.R. 909 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); Dunn v. Dunn, 10 B.R.
385 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); Schutte v. Beneficial Fin., Inc., 8 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1980); Lucero v. Security Indus. Bank., 4 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
47. 14 B.R. at 1008.
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the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, then section 522(f)(2) cannot be applied retroactively. But if the lien is a
security interest created after the Code's enactment, a debtor
may use section 522(f)(2) to avoid the lien.

IV.

THE NONRETROACTIVE AVOIDANCE OF JUDICIAL LIENS

Several cases in the District of South Carolina have considered a debtor's attempt to use section 522(f)(1) to avoid judicial
liens. For example, in Earnhardt v. Herring National Lease,
Inc.,4 8 the debtor filed a complaint to avoid a judgment pursuant
to section 522(f)(1). The bankruptcy court, however, dismissed
the debtor's lien avoidance complaint, finding no enforceable judicial lien on any of the debtor's real or personal property. 49
In Earnhardt,the bankruptcy court noted that under section 15-35-81050 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, "a judgment creates a lien only on the judgment debtor's real estate
located in any county in South Carolina in which the judgment
' Because the debtor
or transcript of judgment is entered."51
owned no real property in the county where the judgment was
recorded, no lien was created against the debtor's real property.52 The court also observed that under section 15-39-100, 53 a
lien on personal property does not attach until levy and execution.54 Thus, because the judgment creditor had not yet attempted to levy and execute on the judgment, the court con-

48. 15 B.R. 86 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).

49. Id. at 87.
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-810 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:

Final judgments and decrees in any court of record in this State, or in any
circuit or district court of the United States within this State or of any other
Federal court the final judgments and decrees of which, by act of Congress,
shall be declared to create a lien, shall constitute a lien upon the real estate of
the judgment debtor situate in any county in this State in which the judgment
or transcript thereof is entered upon the book of abstracts of judgments and
duly indexed, the lien to begin from the time of such entry on the book of

abstracts and indices and to continue for a period of ten years from the date of
such final judgment or decree.

51. 15 B.R. at 87.
52. Id.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-100 (1976) states: "Executions shall not bind the personal property of the debtor, but personal property shall only be bound by actual attachment or levy thereon for the period of four months from the date of such levy."

54. 15 B.R. at 87.
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cluded that there existed no lien against 55the debtor's personal
property to avoid under section 522(f)(1).

Another case involving a debtor's attempt to avoid a judicial
lien pursuant to section 522(f)(1) is Mosely v. Mozingo.56 In
Mosely, the debtor filed a complaint under section 522(f)(1) to
avoid certain judicial liens on the debtor's residence. 7 The liens
totaled more than 26,000 dollars. Using the federal exemptions,"
the debtor claimed a homestead exemption of 7,500 dollars
under section 522(d)(1) and an "any property" exemption of 400
dollars under section 522(d)(5).5 e

The court used two formulas to determine the debtor's equity in the co-owned property and the extent to which the judicial liens were avoidable under the debtor's statutory exemptions.60 First, the court calculated one-half of the equity
remaining in the residence after deducting the amount due on
the first mortgage. After determining one-half of the equity remaining in the residence, the court calculated the amount of the
allowable secured claim by subtracting from the one-half equity
an amount equal to the debtor's statutory exemptions under section 522(d)(1) and (5)."' Based upon these calculations, the court

55. Id.

56. No. 81-00351 (Bankr. D.S.C. Oct. 19, 1981).
57. No. 81-00351, slip op. at 2.
58. At the time of filing, the federal exemptions were still in effect. South Carolina
"opted out" of the federal exemptions on May 5, 1981. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425
(Supp. 1982).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) states:
The following property may be exempted...
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in
real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor uses as a residence ...
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus
any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of
this subsection, in any property.
60. The court adopted the formulas used in Jordan v. Borda, 5 B.R. 59 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1980).
61. The court calculated the amount of the secured claim as follows:
One-Half of Equity
$13,900
Less Lien Avoidance pursuant to
§ 522(0(1) as impairment of
exemptions under § 522(2)(1) & (5)
7,900
Equity to which the judgments may
be applied
$6,000

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss2/4

10

19841

Butler: Lien Avoidance
under
Section 522(f) in the District of South Caro
LIEN
AVOIDANCE

granted judgment for the debtor in the amount of 7,900 dollars,
an amount equal to the debtor's exemptions under section
522(d)(1) and (5).
The bankruptcy court also considered the use of section
522(f)(1) to avoid judicial liens in Hinson v. Lexington State
Bank. 2 In Hinson, the debtors filed a joint petition for relief
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but the case was
later voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. In their joint petitions
for relief, each debtor claimed a homestead exemption of 5,000
dollars in their residence pursuant to section 15-41-200.11
Three mortgages encumbered the debtors' residence. However, before the third mortgage was executed and recorded, four
judicial liefis were entered in the county's abstracts of judgments
against the debtors' residence.6 4 The debtors sought to avoid the
judicial liens to the extent the liens impaired their homestead
exemptions.
Two of the judgment creditors questioned the court's authority to set aside their liens. Based upon section 30-7-10,65 the
judgment creditors argued that their judicial liens did not impair the debtors' homestead exemptions in relation to the mortgage because their liens were created prior to the execution and

62. 20 B.R. 753 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-4-1200 (Supp. 1982) provides, in partThe following real and personal property of a debtor domiciled in this
State shall be exempt from attachment, levy and sale under any mesne or final
process issued by any court or bankruptcy proceedings:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed five thousand dollars in
value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence ..... Provided, however, that the aggregate value of multiple homestead exemptions allowable
with respect to a single living unit may not exceed ten thousand dollars. If
there are multiple owners of such a living unit exempt as a homestead, the
value of the exemption of each individual owner may not exceed his fractional
portion of ten thousand dollars.
64. 20 B.R. at 755-56.
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:

All deeds... mortgages... or other liens on real or personal property or
both, created by law or by agreement of the parties... shall be valid so as to
affect the rights of subsequent creditors.. . only from the day and hour when
they are recorded. . . . [I]n the case of a subsequent lien creditor on real estate.., the instrument evidencing such subsequent holder to claim under this
section as a subsequent creditor.., and the priority shall be determined by
the time of filing for record.
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recording of the third mortgage.6 8 Nevertheless, the court rejected the creditors' argument and adopted the view expressed
in Atlas Supply Co. v. Davise7 that section 30-7-10 protects only

"subsequent creditors" who extend credit after a mortgage is executed but before it. is recorded. 8 Since the creditors in Hinson
did not extend credit after the execution of the third mortgage,
the court held that the judgment creditors were not entitled to
the protection afforded by section 30-7-10. 69 Thus, the court
concluded that the debtors could avoid the judicial liens pursuant to section 522(f)(1) to the extent of the debtors' exempt equity in their residence. 70
V. WHEN Is A PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST NOT A
PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST?
Much of the section 522(f)(2) litigation in the District of
South Carolina has involved the distinctions between a
purchase-money and a nonpurchase-money security interest.
The latter is avoidable under section 522(f)(2); the former is not.
These cases can be divided into two categories: (1) those cases
which determined whether the security interest created was a
purchase-money security interest; and (2) those cases which determined whether a valid, purchase-money security interest lost
its purchase-money character because the creditor subsequently
66. 20 B.R. at 756.
67. 273 S.C. 392, 256 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
68. In discussing whether a judgment recorded prior to the execution and recording
of a mortgage had priority over the mortgage, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
"[Tihe recording statute was intended to protect [sic] against the lien of an unrecorded
mortgage, persons who, without notice of it, subsequent to its exemption might reasonably have extended credit to the mortgagor, or purchased the mortgaged property, in reliance upon his apparently unencumbered ownership ... ." Id. at 394, 256 S.E.2d at 860
(quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wadford, 232 S.C. 476, 480, 102 S.E.2d 889, 891-92
(1958)).
69. 20 B.R. at 757.
70. The court calculated the debtors' equity in the real estate as follows:
$74,900.00
Fair Market Value of the residence
-59,558.87
Less Value of the Three Mortgages
Less Trustee's Commission for Sale
1,629.59
of Residence
Less Real Estate agent's commission
5,247.12
for sale of residence
8,464.42
Yields Equity
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refinanced the debt.
A. Determining Whether a Purchase-Money Security
Interest Was Created
The bankruptcy court considered whether the security interest created was a nonpurchase-money security interest in Manuel v. Blazer FinancialServices, Inc.7 1 In Manuel, the debtors

executed a security agreement granting Blazer a security interest
in the debtors' household goods and furnishings. Blazer issued
several checks to the debtors to enable the debtors to pay off
their existing accounts with other creditors, some of which involved the purchase of household goods. None of the funds advanced were used to purchase household goods or furnishings. In
fact, the debtors purchased all of their household goods and fur7 21
nishings prior to granting Blazer its security interest.
In determining whether Blazer's security interest was a
purchase-money security interest, the court relied upon comment 2 to section 36-9-207. 3 Comment 2 states that if a secured
party is not a seller, the secured party must give "present consideration" in order to claim a purchase-money security interest. 4 The court then adopted the definition of "present consideration" contained in In re Brooks,7 5 which held that present
consideration passes when the creditor gives the debtor value
contemporaneously with the debtor's acquisition of the
property. '
Based upon these definitions, the court in Manuel held that
Blazer did not have a purchase-money security interest in the
debtor's household goods and furnishings because Blazer's loan
did not enable the debtors "to acquire rights in or the use of'
71.
72.
73.
74.

18 B.R. 403 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).
18 BR. at 404.
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (1976), comment 2, states:
When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who is not
a seller, he must of course have given present consideration. This section therefore provides that the purchase money party must be one who gives value "by
making advances or incurring an obligation": the quoted language excludes
from the purchase money category any security interest taken as security for or
in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt.
75. 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 660 (Callaghan)(Bankr. D.Me. 1980).
76. Id. at 663-64.
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those items." Instead, the court concluded that Blazer held a

nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods and
furnishings which the debtor could avoid pursuant to section
522(f)(2).
The bankruptcy court faced another issue in determining
whether a security interest is a purchase-money security interest
in Haus v. Barclays American Corp.75 and Horlbeck v. Dixie
Furniture.79 In both cases the court considered whether a creditor's security interests lost their purchase-money character because each of the consumer goods listed on the security agreement secured a total indebtedness greater than its own
indebtedness.
In Haus, the debtors and the original seller consolidated
and refinanced four purchase-money debts into two security
agreements. The seller subsequently assigned the agreements to
two unrelated assignees.80 The court in Haus held that the security agreements' did not create a purchase-money security interest because at least one of the listed goods secured a total
indebtedness greater than its own indebtedness and because the
subsequent security agreement did not provide a formula for the
application of payments to particular items."2
77. 18 B.R. at 405.
78. 18 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
79. No. 81-01782 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 9, 1982). See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
80. 18 B.R. at 415.
81. One of the security agreements listed only one item of collateral. Id. Thus, this
one item could not secure an indebtedness greater than its own indebtedness and, therefore, was not subject to attack on that ground.
82. The court concluded:
[The creditor's] security interest in the television and washer and dryer also
secured the range which had been paid off when the security agreement was
executed on May 24, 1979. This security agreement made no provision for the
application of payments to particular items and did not indicate the order in
which purchases were to be paid off and the individual amounts due on each
item. Therefore, at least one of the consumer goods listed on the May 24, 1979
security agreement which was assigned to Barclays secured an indebtedness
other than its own, and, therefore, the May 24, 1979 security agreement did
not create a purchase-money security interest.
18 B.R. at 417-18. Accord, King v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 19 B.R. 409 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1982); Kelley v. United Am. Bank, 17 B.R. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re
Luczak, 16 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1982); McLemore v. Simpson County Bank (In re
Krulik) 6 Bankr. 443 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Scott, 5 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980); In re Scott, 5 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1980). Contra,Transamerica Fin.
Serv. v. Matthews, 20 Bankr. 654 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); Slay v. Pioneer Credit Co., 8
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In Horlbeck, the debtor purchased a sofa suite and executed
a security agreement granting the seller a purchase-money security interest. Later, the debtor purchased a television from the
same seller and executed a security agreement in which the
seller added the unpaid balance on the sofa suite to the amount
owed on the television. The debtor later purchased a second television from the same seller and once again executed a security
agreement in which the seller added the unpaid balance on the
sofa and first television to the amount owed- on the second
3
television.

In his petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtor claimed the sofa suite and second television as
exempt property. The debtor then filed an action to avoid the
seller's lien on these two items.
As in Haus, the court in Horlbeck considered whether each
of the consumer goods listed on the last security agreement secured a total indebtedness greater than its own indebtedness,
thus creating avoidable nonpurchase-money security interests.
The court first distinguished the security agreement in Horibeck
from the one in Haus by stating that an original seller may
cross-collateralize under section 37-2-408(1)" and must apply
the payments on the cross-collateralized debts as outlined in
section 37-2-409(1)."5 Because an applicable statutory formula

Bankr. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
83. No. 81-01782, slip op. at 1-2.
84.
In addition to contracting for a security interest pursuant to the provisions
on security in sales or leases (§ 37-2-407), a seller in a consumer credit sale
may secure the debt arising from the sale by contracting for a security interest
in other property if as a result of a prior sale the seller has an existing security
interest in the other property. The seller may also contract for a security interest in the property sold in the subsequent sale as security for the previous
debt.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-408(1) (1976).
85.
If debts arising from two or more consumer credit sales, other than sales
.. . pursuant to a revolving charge account, are secured by cross-collateral (§
37-2-408) or consolidated into one debt payable on a single schedule of payments, and the debt is secured by security interests taken with respect to one
or more of the sales, payments received by the seller after the taking of the
cross-collateral or the consolidation are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have
been applied pro rata to the payment of the debts arising from the sales. Proration shall be computed on the original debts secured by the various security
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existed for applying payments to each item of collateral, the
court concluded that no one item secured an indebtedness
greater than its own. Thus, the security interests in question retained their purchase-money character."'
The different results in Haus and Horlbeck demonstrate
that whether a security interest is a purchase-money security interest may depend upon whether the secured party is an "original seller." 87 If the secured party is an "original seller," then be-

interests. To the extent debts are paid according to this section, security interests in items of property terminate as the debts originally incurred with respect to each item are paid.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-409(1) (1976). The court distinguished Horlbeck from Haus as
follows:
Although S.C. Code § 37-2-408 (1976) allows a seller in a consumer credit
sale to cross-collateralize, "an assignee not related to the original seller" may
not. Since the assignees in Haus were "not related to the original seller," they
were note entitled to cross-collateralize under S.C. Code § 37-2-409(1) (1976)
nor bound by the language of S.C. Code § 37-2-409(1) (1976) which sets out a
rule for applying payments to debts secured by cross-collateral.... Due to
the absence of a contractual or statutory formula for the application of payments in Haus, this court held the security interests to be nonpurchase-money
security interests.
The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Haus. Dixie, being the
original seller, may cross-collateralizeunder S.C. Code § 37-2-408(1) (1976),
and is bound to apply the payments on the cross-collateralizeddebts in the
manner set out in S.C. Code § 37-2-409(1) (1976).
No. 81-01782, slip op. at 4-5 (citation and footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).
86. After determining that an applicable statutory formula existed for applying payments pro rata to the unpaid balance due on cross-collateralized debts, the court applied
a complex formula to the items of collateral to determine the remaining balance due on
each debt.
To apply the formula, the court first determined the "original debt" or the percentage of the cash price that each item bears to the total actual cash price of all the items.
No. 81-01782, slip op. at 5. These percentages of the payments received are allocated pro
rata to each item of collateral to determine the amount paid on that item. When the pro
rated payments on any item are equal to that item's percentage of the total debt secured,
including finance charges, insurance, and any other charges, then the security interest on
that item is satisfied and terminated; any unpaid balance constitutes a purchase-money
debt. Id.
The court laboriously applied this formula so that in future cases sellers who must
apply payments to cross-collateralized debts would have an example to follow. Also, the
court appeared to suggest that sellers who desired to use this rule to preserve their
purchase-money status must provide the court with an accounting of the payments received and their application to the items of collateral under the formula.
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-408(1) (1976) states that "[sleller in this section does not
include an assignee not related to the original seller." (emphasis in original). The South
Carolina Consumer Protection Code, however, does not define "original seller," although
a "seller" is defined at § 37-2-107.
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cause of the statutory formula, s" each item of collateral retains
its purchase-money character, even if the debt is cross-collateralized. The statutory formula is used to determine when each
item of collateral is paid off and the security interest in that
item is terminated. This procedure prevents any item of collateral from securing a total indebtedness greater than its own indebtedness and rendering the security interest nonpurchasemoney in nature. If, however, the seller is not an "original
seller," and the security agreement contains no formula for applying payments, then the security interest is considered nonpurchase-money.
B. Determining the Effect of Refinancing Purchase-Money
Security Interests
Those cases considering the effect of section 522(f)(2) on refinanced purchase-money security interests fall into two categories: (1) cases involving purchase-money security interests retained by sellers under section 36-9-107(a), and (2) cases
involving purchase-money security interests retained by nonsellers under section 36-9-107(b). 9
1. Refinanced Purchase-Money Security Interests Under
Section 36-9-107(a)
Two cases have discussed the effects of refinancing a
purchase-money security interest, retained by the seller under
section 36-9-107(b), and the avoidability of such a security interest under section 522(f)(2)(A). In Haus v. Barclays American
Corp.,e° the debtors executed four sales contracts for the
purchase of household goods. The seller, Cate-McLaurin Company, Inc. (Cate-McLaurin), retained title to the merchandise

88. See supra note 85.

89. S.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 36-9-107 (1976) provides:

A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent
that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
90. 18 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). See supra notes 78, 80-82 and accompanying
text.
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until the purchase price was paid in full. Several months later,
the debtors signed two security agreements granting CateMcLaurin security interests in the merchandise purchased
through and listed in the sales contracts. These security agreements were assigned to Barclays American Corporation (Barclays) and Westinghouse Credit Corporation (Westinghouse),
neither of which was related to the original seller, CateMcLaurin.
The debtors later filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code. In their petition for relief, the debtors
claimed the merchandise listed in the four sales contracts, and
later in the two security agreements, as exempt property. The
debtors then filed an action to avoid Barclays' and Westinghouse's liens in the household goods. Barclays and Westinghouse
answered, claiming to be holders of purchase-money security interests not avoidable under section 522(f)(2)(A).
The court's first step in Haus was to examine the nature of
the liens held by the original seller, Cate-McLaurin. e ' The court
concluded that the four sales contracts (in which the seller retained title to the merchandise until payment in full was received) were security agreements as described in section 36-9203(1)(a), 2 because the sales contracts adequately described the
collateral and were signed by the debtors. The court also found
that these four sales contracts created purchase-money security
interests under section 36-9-107(a),93 which were automatically
perfected under section 36-9-302(1)(d) 4
The court then applied the refinancing rule contained in

91. The court stated that this step was necessary because:
In South Carolina the assignee of a contract acquires a purchase-money security interest when it is assigned a contract in which the assignor previously has
acquired a purchase-money security interest. 1967-1968 Op. Att'y Gen., No.
2407, p.52 . Therefore, whether the defendants have purchase-money security
interests depends on whether the seller, . . . possessed-at the time of assignment to the defendants-purchase-money security interests in the goods.
18 B.R. at 415.
92. "[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third party unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party,
S.C. CODE: ANN. § 36-9203(1)(a) (1976).
93. See supra note 89.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(1)(d) states, in part- "A financing statement must be
filed to perfect all security interest(s) except the following. (d) a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods; . ..

."
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Rosen v. Associates FinancialServices Co.9 5 and held that the
seller's refinancing of the debts secured by the four purchasemoney security interests extinguished the security interests'
purchase-money character. 96 Therefore, the debtors could avoid
the assigned security interests to the extent that they impaired
97
the debtors' exemptions in household goods.
The second case considering refinanced purchase-money security interests was Horlbeck v. Dixie Furniture5 In Horlbeck,
the debtor claimed a sofa suite and second television as exempt
property and subsequently filed a complaint to avoid the creditor's liens on those items. The creditor answered, claiming to be
the holder of three purchase-money security interests not avoidable under'section 522(f)(2)(A).
Because the purchase-money security interest in the sofa
suite had been refinanced twice, the court, based upon Haus,
held that the purchase-money security interest in that item was
extinguished, thus creating a nonpurchase-money security interest in the sofa suite which the debtor could avoid.9 9 However,
since the purchase-money debt was never refinanced, the security interest in the second television retained its purchase-money
character and was not avoidable under section 522(f)(2)(A).1 00
After Haus and Horlbeck, the refinancing of a purchasemoney security interest retained by a seller under section 36-9107(a) extinguishes the security interest's purchase-money character. Debtors may avoid a nonpurchase-money security interest
under section 522(f)(2) to the extent it impairs the debtor's
exemption.
2. Refinanced Purchase-Money Security Interests Under
Section 36-9-107(b)
The applicability of section 522(f)(2) to a purchase-money
security interest retained by a secured party other than the orig-

95. 18 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981). See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying
text. Mulcahy v. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp., 3 B.R. 454 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1980).
96. 18 B.R. at 413.
97. Id. at 418.
98. No. 81-01782 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 9, 1982). See supra notes 79, 83-88 and accompanying text.
99. No. 81-01782, slip op. at 8.
100. Id.
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inal seller and subsequently refinanced represents another difficult area. One case dealing with this subject is Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Co.101 In Rosen, a finance company
retained a valid purchase-money security interest in the debtor's
household appliances. Twenty-eight days after the first
purchase-money loan was made, the finance company made a
second loan to the debtor. The second loan was also secured by
the same appliances. The proceeds from the second loan were
used to satisfy the first loan.
In its analysis, the court first determined that the second
loan merely refinanced the first loan. 102 The court then stated
that since the major portion of the funds from the second loan
were used to pay off and refinance an antecedent debt, the
finance company had not given the present consideration necessary under section 36-9-107(b) to create a purchase-money security interest in the collateral.103 The court then held that the
security interest was nonpurchase-money in nature and, therefore, avoidable under section 522(f)(2)(A). °4
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to briefly survey those bankruptcy cases decided in the District of South Carolina which affect lien avoidance under section 522(f). This survey should assist debtors, creditors, and their attorneys in understanding the
current case law interpreting this section. It is hoped that this
improved understanding will further the efficient administration
of bankruptcy cases in the District of South Carolina.

101. 18 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).
102. In reaching this decision, the court examined such factors as (1) the same collateral secured the second debt as well as the original debt, and (2) the debtor acquired
his rights in the collateral at the time of the first loan, rather than at the second loan.
103. See supra note 89.
104. The Court stated that "[w]hen the proceeds from the renewal vote were used to
satisfy the original note, the purchase-money character of the security interest was extinguished with the result that it became a nonpurchase-money security instru-ment." 18
B.R. at 725. Accord, Safeway Fin. v. Ward, 15 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1981); King v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 19 B.R. 409 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In re Calloway, 17 B.R.
212 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Lay, 15 B.R. 841 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Jones,
5 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980). Contra, Transamerica Fin. Serv. v. Matthews, 20
B.R. 654 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Georgia, 22 BR. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio.
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